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Introduction
The Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) are diagnostic guidelines – or their logic, 
at least – used by the Brazilian Unified Health System 
(SUS) for carrying out epidemiological studies and 
establishing funding for the mental health network. Thus, 
analyzing them is of epistemic and political importance. 
The diagnostic reduction to a description of signs and 
symptoms operated by these manuals sets aside the 
clinical method and results in diagnostic errors, which 
especially damages the organization of the mental health 
network treatments.
In addition to psychotic people being the 
majority served by the mental health network (Teixeira, 
2007), psychosis is one of the few terms from classic 
psychopathology and psychoanalysis that remain in these 
manuals; thus, it allows one to better establish the network 
of comparisons between these different ways of thinking 
regarding the psychological suffering.
Supported in these propositions, we performed 
a critical analysis of the term psychosis in the DSM-IV-
TR, DSM-V, and ICD-10, subsidized by the theoretical 
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framework of psychoanalysis. The appropriation of this 
concept supports itself on a purely descriptive definition, 
as a refusal strategy to the etiological discussion. As the 
presence of hallucinations and delusions is the criterion 
for diagnosing a psychotic disorder, they are defined from 
a concept of reality taken as evidence. Hallucination is 
defined as an error of perception and delusion as a false 
belief of reality. Both present the criterion for impairment 
regarding sociability, which is determined in relation to the 
impaired reality.
Moreover, we took hallucination as our guiding 
principle of analysis because it is still a paradox of definition 
in psychopathological history: the whole problem of 
hallucination seems to be linked to the fact that it is defined, 
almost solely, as perceptions without object (Álvarez, 
2008). The uniformity that has defined hallucination since 
Esquirol, in his Tratado completo de las enajenaciones 
mentales consideradas bajo su aspecto médico, higienico y 
medico-legal, from 1838, until the Tratado das Alucinações 
of Henri Ey, published in 1937, is critically examined by 
Álvarez (2008): the first paragraph that Esquirol dedicates 
to hallucination became a classic quote, a definition that 
continues to resonate even today: “un hombre que tiene la 
convicción íntima de una sensación actualmente percebida, 
aun cuando ningún objeto hiera sus sentidos, se encuentra 
en un estado de alucinación; es un visionario” (Esquirol 
apud Álvarez, 2008, p. 131).
Colina (2001) points out that this is not exactly a 
perception without object, as the conventional definition 
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assumes, but a “perception without subject”: without a 
subject of the word that is able to channel the perception 
to its capacity and natural expression. If the classification 
manuals of mental disorders define both hallucination and 
delusion from an objectifying and assumed definition of 
this reality, it is precisely at this point that we propose 
tightening the concept of reality supported by such defi-
nitions and the psychoanalytic elucidation regarding this 
issue. Nevertheless, psychoanalysis has always had to 
deal with the question of reality. Estevão (2009) reminds 
us of the importance of this concept to Freud since the 
beginning of his work, precisely because it did not seem 
like just an assumption. Some crucial Freudian texts to 
the design of this concept are On Aphasia, from 1891, the 
Project for a Scientific Psychology, Formulations on the 
Two Principles of Mental Functioning, Negation, Neurosis 
and Psychosis, and The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and 
Psychosis (Estevão, 2009). Thus, in Freud (1891/1979), we 
have already seen that reality is given through assigning 
meaning as opposed to an objectively given reality.
Lacan, starting from the Freudian premise, 
emphasizes the importance of the subject’s relationship 
with the Other and the significant organization in 
this subjective construction of reality. It is from these 
coordinates that hallucination is thought of by the symbolic 
order, settling that the “perceptual relationship with reality 
is not as natural as one could imagine, but a function of the 
significant phenomena” (Soler, 2007, p. 26).
To the conception of univocality of a reality 
previously assumed, explicitly supported by the 
characterization of hallucination as a criterion for defining a 
psychotic disorder in the DSM, psychoanalysis emphasizes 
a preceding questioning that we propose developing here: 
the lack of unity in the very subject to which reality is 
supposed to be true.
The International Classification  
of Diseases (ICD-10) and  
the descriptive status of psychosis
Unlike neurosis, which has suffered a purging 
process from the DSM, the term psychosis suffered a 
fragmentation, being reduced to a category within a group 
of disorders known as “Schizophrenia and other Psychotic 
Disorders”. The DSM-IV (revised in 2000, therefore DSM-
IV-TR) was developed along with the chapter on mental 
disorders of the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10) in a collaborative work between the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO). Due to the fact that these revisions 
have been made in parallel, the definition of psychosis in 
both manuals is very similar.
Chapter V of ICD-10 refers to the classification of 
Mental and Behavior Disorders, whose version Clinical 
descriptions and diagnostic guidelines (WHO, 1993) is 
intended for clinical, educational, and health-care use in 
general. The clinical descriptions of each disorder are 
provided from a description of signs and symptoms that 
are considered “major” along with other “less important 
associated aspects”; and the diagnostic guidelines are 
described indicating the number of symptoms required for 
a reliable diagnosis to be made.
According to the revisers of this version, the clinical 
descriptions contain a certain degree of flexibility that 
allows a provisional diagnosis to be made when a clinical 
picture is not entirely clear. However, the existence of 
clinical implications is undeniable, specifically regarding 
treatment orientation, when establishing an early diagnosis 
or one based on insufficient clinical traits. Freud, in his 
text “Wild psychoanalysis” (1910/1996), already spoke of 
the caution that must be taken for diagnosis.
In this text, he made a criticism of a misdiagnosis 
based on a standardization of the theory, in this case, of 
the psychoanalytic concepts. He presents the case of a 
woman who complained of anxious states while she and 
her husband were getting divorced. After being diagnosed 
by a young doctor inspired by a trivial reading of 
psychoanalysis (who said that her anxiety was due to lack 
of sexual satisfaction), the treatment was then imposed: she 
should choose between returning to the husband, having an 
affair, or resorting to masturbation. The case is analyzed by 
Freud in a double perspective: in relation to the practician’s 
notion of sexuality, reduced to the sexual act and genitality; 
and in relation to the establishment of the diagnosis and 
treatment that will depend on this.
Freud argues that the practician probably assumed 
a clinical diagnosis of anxiety neurosis due to the woman’s 
complaint of anxiety and that, therefore, the treatment 
would involve some modification of the somatic sexual 
activity of the patient. However,
A person suffering from anxiety is not necessarily 
suffering from anxiety neurosis; thus, this diag-
nosis cannot be based on the description [of the 
symptom]; one has to know which signs constitute 
anxiety neurosis and be able to distinguish it from 
other pathological states that are also manifested by 
anxiety. (Freud, 1910/1996, p. 139)
This warning is both relevant and current: there is 
no direct correlation between symptom and diagnosis. For 
Freud, the woman suffered from anxiety hysteria, which 
would imply a different etiology and treatment. The result 
of a diagnosis based solely on the phenomenic aspect of 
the pathology is conducting a treatment that is not relevant 
for the pain of the subject. This is, or should be, the most 
deficitary implication for the clinic.
With this clinical implication, would the prepara-
tion of a diagnosis not be even more harmful – to the sub-
ject – when the clinical picture still does not allow a clear 
understanding of the articulation of signs and symptoms, 
as the clinical guidelines of the ICD-10 propose? As Dor 
(1991) reminds us, “the analyst should be able to lean on 
certain stable elements, both in preparing the diagnosis 
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and in choosing the best path to cure, from which there 
depends” (p. 15).
In the introductory part of this version, the writers 
previously warn about “the lasting and notoriously 
difficult problems associated with the description 
and classification” (WHO, 1993, p. 1) of acute and 
transient psychotic disorders. Nevertheless, they claim 
that the proposed descriptions and guidelines do not 
contain theoretical implications. For this, they resume 
psychopathological terms, only emphasizing their 
descriptive aspect. Psychosis was maintained for being 
a “simple and familiar” term (WHO, 1993, p. 99), and 
reduced, for convenience, to its semiological aspect:
Psychotic was kept as a convenient descriptive 
term . . . . Its use does not involve assumptions 
about psychodynamic mechanisms, but simply in-
dicates the presence of hallucinations, delusions or 
of a limited number of multiple behavioral abnor-
malities. (WHO, 1993, p. 3)
Chapter V of ICD-10 provides a separation between 
what was named as ‘acute and transient psychotic disorders’ 
and schizophrenia, stating that schizophrenia is not the 
same as the “very acute psychoses that abruptly begin, have 
a short course of a few weeks or even days and a favorable 
evolution” (WHO, 1993, p. 10). This separation, however, 
is not intelligible and seems to be obscure to the revisers 
themselves: “The criteria proposed for its differentiation 
(schizophrenia) highlights the problems for defining the 
mutual limits of this entire group of disorders (acute and 
transient psychotic disorders) in practical terms” (WHO, 
1993, p. 12).
The diagnosis of schizophrenia is established when 
there is a presence of delusions, hallucinations, and other 
typical symptoms for at least a month. However, when 
these same symptoms do not satisfy the minimum duration 
of time, a diagnosis should be made firstly in the category 
of acute and transient psychotic disorders, or, more 
specifically, in the diagnosis of acute schizophreniform 
psychotic disorder. Finally, if the symptoms persist for 
a longer time, the reclassification for the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is recommended.
While the ICD-10 proposes the criterion of at least 
one month duration for the symptoms to diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, it indicates that some national classifications 
adopt the criterion of six months for the same diagnosis. 
However, as is justified by revisers, “in the current state of 
ignorance, there seems to be no benefit in restricting the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia in that way” (WHO, 1993, p. 11). 
And once again, they resort to the so-called atheorism and 
the descriptivist principle of avoiding commenting on the 
etiology:
Therefore, it seems better for the purposes of the 
ICD-10 to avoid any assumption about the chroni-
city required for schizophrenia and considering the 
term as descriptive of a syndrome with a variety 
of causes (many of which are still unknown) and a 
variety of developments, depending on the balance 
of genetic, physical, social, and cultural influences. 
(WHO, 1993, p. 11)
Given this classification project, based on atheorism, 
the term mental illness presents itself as an impossibility 
for its realization. We know that the classification in 
mental illness implies, necessarily, obeying the criteria 
of the anatomopathological method: starting from the 
signs and symptoms observed, one searches for injuries 
and/or corresponding brain dysfunctions. Thus, according 
to Aguiar (2004), the specificity of a biological marker will 
allow for an etiological explanation of the disease.
However, etiology is still a dark continent for 
promoters of classification systems, not only from the 
ICD-10, but also from the DSM. The term “disorder” is 
used throughout the classification to avoid even greater 
problems inherent to the use of terms such as “disease” or 
“illness”. It is clear that “the problems inherent” to these 
terms refer to the etiological aspects involved. The refusal 
for the etiological discussion of the diseases is reinforced 
by the search for a term that is immune to theoretical and 
etiologic implications. Mental disorders are often associated 
with pain or disabilities that impair the sociability of the 
individual (APA, 2014).
Before the absence of this biological marker that 
allows one to confirm the etiology, the found solution 
was ignorance. It would be easier to ignore the etiological 
mechanisms of diseases rather than revive the historical 
debate in the field of psychopathology between those who 
defend organicism and those who defend psychism. The 
strategic abandonment of the term “mental illness” and 
the adoption of the term “disorder” is the focal point for 
grounding a classification system that aims to ensure a 
scientific status and, in turn, ensure the alleged universality.
It is noticed that some disorders have a temporary 
and transitory nature, i.e., a premeditated validity and that, 
depending on the duration of symptoms, are reclassified in 
other disorders. In many cases, the duration of signs and 
symptoms is the threshold for establishing the two different 
diagnoses.
In this perspective, the concept of comorbidity 
becomes a questionable point. Comorbidity is the simul-
taneous occurrence of two or more psychiatric disorders, 
and it may have the most variable diagnoses to a same case, 
often gathering categories of contradictory symptoms. The 
DSM III, published in 1980, was based on a hierarchy of 
diagnoses based on the identification of only one pathology 
to encompass all the symptoms that represent a patient’s 
condition. However, with the advent of DSM-III-R in 1987, 
this hierarchy of diagnostic axes was replaced regardless of 
the concept of comorbidity. (Kyrillos Neto, Silva, Pederzoli, 
& Hernandes, 2011).
As a result, we have the prevalence of two or more 
diagnostic categories of different axes in establishing one 
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diagnosis, that is, two or more diagnoses for the same 
subject. The concept of comorbidity was maintained in 
the revision of the fourth edition of the manual (DSM-IV-
TR) and is widely used in the DSM-V. (Matos, E.; Matos, 
T., & Matos, G., 2005). For the revisers of the DSM-V, 
comorbidity, in cases of psychiatric disorders, is a rule, not 
an exception.
DSM-IV-TR and DSM-V: a naive realism in 
the definition of the criteria of psychosis 
Let us now take a look at the definition of psychosis 
in the DSM-IV-TR, a multi-axis and category diagnosis 
system, which means it works with five axes, each one 
covering a area of information: Axis I comprises the clinical 
disorders and other conditions that may be a focus of clinical 
attention. Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders are 
part of this axis. Axis II includes personality disorders 
and mental retardation. Axis III includes general medical 
conditions that are important to the diagnosis and treatment. 
Axis IV refers to the psychosocial and environmental 
problems that can equally affect the diagnosis and treatment 
of the disorder identified in Axis I. Lastly, Axis V presents 
the Global Assessment of Functioning.
As in its penultimate edition, the DSM-V no longer 
has an exclusively clinical use. Essentially, Laurent (2013) 
points out that few things will change between DSM-
IV-TR and DSM-V, since “the DSM is still founded on a 
‘consensus on the regroupings of clinical symptoms’, and 
not on an ‘objective’ measurement of anything” (p. 21). 
The category diagnosis model adopted in the last revised 
editions was replaced by the longitudinal model, providing 
a predictive character to the diagnoses. DSM-V revisers 
thusly justify such a change in the structure of the manual:
The results of numerous studies on comorbidity in-
dicated that the boundaries between several “cate-
gories” of disorders are more fluid throughout the 
course of life . . . and many symptoms attributed 
to a single disorder can occur, at different levels of 
severity, in various other disorders. These findings 
indicate that the DSM . . . must seek ways to include 
dimensional approaches to mental disorders. (APA, 
2014, p. 5)
However, it is important to highlight a movement 
that has been called “a clash of titans in mental health” 
(APA, 2013) concerning the advent of the DSM-V. Laurent 
(2013) draws attention to the fact that weeks before the 
release of the fifth edition of the DSM, the United States 
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), when 
proposing a new project of diagnostic research of mental 
disorders, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), revealed 
that it will refrain from funding research based on the 
diagnostic categories of the DSM. Fajnwaks (2013) points 
out that the creation of a new classification from the RDoC, 
based on a biogenetic approach and use of neuroimaging, 
represents a death sentence of the classification project 
for the diagnosis of mental illness in the DSM models. 
According to Laurent:
This is grouping, in a project titled Research 
Domain Criteria (RDoC), everything that has been 
isolated by science as objective signs in the field 
of psychopathology: neuroimaging, likely genetic 
markers, change of cognitive functions and their 
objectifiable circuits, in three key areas: cognition, 
emotion, and behaviors. The RDoC aims to esta-
blish a mapping of the set of these aspects through 
the continuum of the field, passing over the diffe-
rent tags and sub-groups of the DSM that divide 
endlessly. (Laurent, 2013, p. 21)
The DSM, which is responsible for the precipitation 
of a clinic with logical-positivist inspiration and that has 
been the main tool for the diagnosis and classification of 
mental disorders, may undergo changes in this status with 
the new RDoC project by NIMH, which incorporates 
behavioral and neuroscientific evidence.
Fajnwaks (2013) observes that this movement 
summarizes the current paradigm shift that guides the 
issue of psychiatric diagnoses. Judging from the reactions 
that preceded and followed the recent publication of the 
DSM-V, it is possible to conclude that we are witnessing the 
end of an era: the era of inconsistent classifications present 
in the DSM.
This paradigm shift regarding diagnosis is driven by 
what is called authority in the field of neuropsychiatry: the 
results of molecular biology (neuroscience and genetics). 
The use of neuroscience for diagnosis is defended by the 
promoters of RDoC as a secure, materialistic, and scientific 
means given the inconsistency of the DSM classifications 
and the hyperinflation of diagnoses resulting from the 
creation of this manual. On the other hand, there would be 
the establishment of a “clinical neuroscience” in the field 
of psychic suffering, specifically when building diagnoses.
Let us review. In the introductory section, regarding 
the uses and concepts of the DSM-IV-TR, there is the 
statement: “the sets of criteria have been simplified and 
clarified, when this could be justified by empirical data” 
(APA, 2004, p. 14). The strategy used to avoid calling upon 
explanatory systems – what would ensure the atheorism 
and scientificity of the manual – is supported, as we will 
see below, with the definition of the term psychotic, in 
an attempt to not extend the borders of the definitions, 
appealing to the description and pure visibility of the 
phenomenon.
The DSM-IV-TR justifies that the term psychotic 
has never had a widely accepted definition and, for 
purposes of this manual, psychotic was “conceptually 
defined as a loss of ego boundaries or a large impairment 
of the reality testing” (APA, 2004, p. 303), as opposed to 
the definition used in previous classifications that were too 
comprehensive. In the DSM-IV-TR, psychotic is reduced to 
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the presence of certain symptoms, which vary to a certain 
degree between the diagnostic categories.
The term “psychotic” was delimited from three 
meanings, ranging from a more restricted to a broader 
plan. In a more restricted definition, the term psychosis 
would specify the presence of delusions and hallucinations 
with no insight into their pathological nature. In an 
intermediate definition, psychosis would be characterized 
by the presence of hallucinations, but with the individual 
seeing them as pathological experiences. Finally, in 
a broader perspective, in addition to delusions and 
hallucinations, the positive symptoms of schizophrenia 
are considered, such as disorganized speech and catatonia. 
In the first case, we would have the Psychotic Disorder 
due to a General Medical Condition and Substance-
Induced Psychotic Disorder; in the second case, 
Delusional Disorders and Induced Psychotic Disorders 
– and psy chosis would almost be synonym of delusion; 
and in the third case, Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform 
Disorders, Schizoaffective Disorders, and Brief Psychotic 
Disorders (APA, 2004). Arguably, the manual justifies 
that the grouping, in more restricted and broader terms, 
is a facilitator of the differential diagnosis of disorders 
that include psychotic symptoms as a prominent aspect 
of their presentation, stating that the difference between 
them rests in their frequency and that there is no common 
etiology (Calazans & Bastos, 2013).
If the presence or absence of delusions and 
hallucinations is the criterion for categorizing a psychotic 
disorder, we must then pay attention to how the DSM-IV-
TR defines them. Hallucination is defined as “a sensory 
perception that presents the sense of reality of a real 
perception, but that occurs without external stimulation 
from the relevant sensory organ” (APA, 2004, p. 766). 
Delusion is, in turn, taken as a
false belief based on an incorrect inference about 
the external reality, which is firmly maintained, 
despite what almost everybody else believes and 
despite incontestable proof or contrary evidence. 
This belief is not usually accepted by other members 
of the culture or sub-culture. (APA, 2004, p. 767)
Such definitions have remained in the current 
edition of the manual. In the DSM-V (APA, 2014), delusions 
are defined as “fixed beliefs that are not likely to change 
in the light of conflicting evidence” (p. 87). The degree of 
conviction with which the belief is held, “despite clear or 
reasonable contradictory evidence about their truth” (APA, 
2014, p. 87), is the element that would distinguish the 
delusion from a firmly defended idea. The condition that 
hallucinations must occur in the context of an “unchanged 
sensory” remains as a definer of hallucinations: “they are 
experiences similar to perceptions that occur without an 
external stimulus. They are vivid and clear, with the full 
force and impact of normal perceptions, not being under 
voluntary control” (APA, 2014, p. 88).
Nevertheless, these definitions have the inconve-
nience of sticking to phenomenic descriptions from what 
Chalmers (1993) characterized as a naive realism. Reality 
taken as evidence, as a fact that is imposed in itself, 
promotes, in the words of Kyrillos Neto and Calazans 
(2012) “a new juror faith in the existence of indelible facts 
that are independent of a discourse” (p. 12). By favoring 
the observable and empirically accessible dimension of 
psychic disorders, we have the disregard of the structuring 
dimension of the look as a consequence (Kyrillos Neto & 
Calazans, 2012). In this sense:
any clinical perspective that considers having 
access to a objectifiable reality that can serve as 
a criterion of demarcation between reality and 
fantasy is nothing more than a positivist doctrine 
with devastating political consequences regarding 
the subjectivity. The empirical reality could not 
be the mainstay of the meaning, since the place of 
the object for psychoanalysis is empty. There is no 
extralinguistic reality able to support the signifier. 
(Cardoso & Lustoza, 2012, p. 119)
Almeida (2008) argues that the philosophical 
orientation of the DSM is not studied, only incorporated. 
We would therefore have a vulgar empiricism. And as 
the pretense of empiricism, in general, is to have access 
to reality with the minimal possible load of metaphysics, 
the most immediate effect of empiricism and metaphysical 
asepsis is the required correlation that the DSM extends 
between the definitions of delusion and hallucination and 
the so-called “reality testing”.
The exaggerated use of phenomenic definitions, as 
proposed by DSM-IV and ICD-10, makes it impossible to 
distinguish psychosis from what it is not, i.e., to establish 
a differential diagnosis. Because, with these definitions 
and criteria, how could we consider, for example, the 
hysterical conversions, compulsive thoughts and acts, 
phobic behaviors? Do these not harm social conviviality? 
If we take seriously the question that, in schizophrenia, 
we have disorganized speech, are we not able to find the 
same speech disorganization in some disorders that are 
not psychotic? On the other hand, do we not have paranoid 
people with organized speech? Are not phobic ideas 
unacceptable to social conviviality and could they not be 
considered as “false beliefs?”. Thus, will we consider every 
phobic person as delusional – and, therefore, psychotic? 
–Could anorexic people who say they are fat not have 
their perception considered as true and without “external 
stimulation from the relevant sensory organ?”. These are 
some tributary issues of a purely descriptive definition 
that is supported based on an objective judgment of reality, 
which is imposed to the subject to the detriment of his/her 
orientation in the relationship with the Other and his/her 
modes of jouissance.
1132017   I   volume 28   I   número 1   I   108-117
Regarding hallucination and reality: the psychosis in ICD-10, DSM-IV-TR, and DSM-V and the psychoanalytic counterpoint 
113
Psychosis and the subjective construction 
of reality in psychoanalysis 
The idea of a merely given reality, objectively 
imposed to the subject, is criticized by psychoanalysis. By 
linking perception and representation, Freud (1891/1979) 
conceptualizes reality from an assignment of meaning. 
That is, the allocation of meaning mediates the subject-
perception relationship, and it is this relation that constitutes 
the reality.
Reality was approached by Freud indirectly: the 
impossibility of defining an anatomical and physiological 
substrate for hysteria put in check, according to Estevão 
(2009),the meaning of reality in which Freud graduated 
as a doctor. Specifically regarding psychosis, “The loss 
of reality in neurosis and psychosis” (1924/1996) is a text 
of major importance on this theme.
Freud (1924/1996) demarcates the distinction 
between neurosis and psychosis in relation with loss of 
reality, noting some similarities and differences of this 
detachment from reality. In neurosis, the “I” obeys the 
demands of reality and represses the pulsional demands, 
whereas in psychosis, the “I” is under the domain of the “It” 
and turns away from reality. For Freud, this detachment 
from reality in psychoses occurs in a first stage, when the 
“I” rejects the external reality and, in a second stage, as the 
“I” tries to replace the external reality with the delirious 
reality: “also in psychosis, two steps could be discerned, 
the first of which would drag the ‘I’ away, this time far 
from reality, while the second would try to repair the 
damage caused and restore the individual’s relationship 
with reality” (Freud, 1924/1996, p. 230).
The delusion would be the attempt to reconstruct 
a new reality. “The second step of psychosis, it is true, is 
intended to repair the loss of reality” from the “creation 
of a new reality” (Freud, 1924/1996, p. 230). While the 
neurosis only ignores reality, psychosis repudiates it and 
tries to replace it. It is important to point out that this 
relationship with reality is by no means static, one-sided, 
or “objective”:
the transformation of reality is carried out on 
the psychic precipitates of old relationships with 
it – that is, on the traces of memory, ideas and 
judgments that were previously derived from 
reality and through which reality was represented 
in the mind. This relationship, however, has never 
been a closed relationship; it was continuously 
enriched and changed by new perceptions (Freud, 
1924/1996, p. 231).
The way the DSM-IV-TR and the current edition of 
the manual (DSM-V) define hallucination is based on the 
idea of a perceptual error, more specifically, by correlating 
the idea of adequacy of perception to reality, which would 
take place by the sensory organs. Soler (2007) says that the 
perceptual phenomena demand a meticulous effort, since 
from there one can establish formulations of what is called 
objectivity.
The issue of perception was introduced in 
psychoanalysis from the experience of Freud on neurosis 
and its relationship with reality, specifically from neurosis 
under transfer: “the very subject of the unconscious, 
insofar as it comes into play during the transfer, introduces 
the problem of perception in psychoanalysis” (Soler, 2007, 
p. 25). In this perspective, Nasio (1997) points out that there 
is only hallucination in the relationship with the other, 
applying the issue of hallucination in the practical and 
theoretical scope of the transferential relationship.
From the Freudian assumptions, the reality in 
Lacan is almost always marked by the symbolic as a 
subjectification of the significant dimension (Vieira, 2003). 
Lacan (1958/1998) held a relevant criticism regarding the 
determination of hallucination as a disturbance of reality, 
reissued and proclaimed by the classification manuals. In 
On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of 
psychosis (1958/1998), the alleged unity of a percipiens is 
questioned.
In this text, the formulations that will accompany all 
Lacanian schools in relation to psychosis are systematized 
(except the reformulation of the pillar concepts that emerged 
from the so-called “second clinic”): the foreclosure of 
the Name of the Father in place of the Other, the failure 
of the paternal metaphor, and the absence of a phallic 
signification. Lacan performs a semantic analysis of the 
phenomena of psychosis, based on the subject’s relationship 
with the signifier.
The review undertaken on the notion of the subject 
of perception (percipiens) and perceived object (perceptum) 
and its articulation in the classical proposition advocated 
by most theoretical positions concerning the perceptual 
phenomena is that hallucination would be a perceptum with 
no object:
We dare, in effect, to put in the same bag, so 
to speak, all positions on the matter, whether 
mechanistic or dynamic, either from the organism 
or the psyche, and the structure, of disintegration or 
conflict, yes, all of them, no matter how ingenious 
they are deemed, to the extent that, in the name of 
the manifest fact that a hallucination is a perceptum 
with no object, these positions are satisfied in asking 
the percipiens a justification of this perceptum, with 
no one realizing that, in this question, one moment is 
skipped: that of asking whether the perceptum itself 
leaves a univocal meaning in the percipiens here 
requested to explain it. (Lacan, 1958/1998, p. 538)
Lacan gathers all these theories on the basis of the 
same inability to explain hallucination. The consequence of 
this shared proposition that hallucination is the perceptum 
with no object is asking the subject of the perception to 
justify this perceptum, without asking if this perceptum 
produces a meaning on this subject.
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To think about the phenomenon of hallucination, as 
Quinet (2004) explains, Lacan resumes the phenomenology 
in which there is no phenomenon without the subject of 
perception: “the percipiens, far from being external, 
takes part in the perceptum, the subject of perception 
being included in the perceived” (p. 36). Husserl posits 
that the subject of perception is not out of the world, out 
of the phenomenon. The author introduces the subject and 
his immanence in the very phenomenon: “every position 
of a ‘non-immanent being’, of a being not contained in 
the phenomenon . . . is placed out of the circuit, that is, 
suspended” (Husserl apud Quinet, 2004, p. 36).
Despite sharing the enunciation of Husserl regarding 
the very subject of perception being part of the phenomenon, 
Lacan deals with a subject that is divided and determined by 
language, contradicting the fact that the “phenomenology of 
perception is organized from the concept of a unified subject 
(the subject that perceives) and of a predecessor unity of the 
object” (Sanábio, 2010, para.29). Thus, in psychoanalysis, 
the phenomenon must be previously analyzed, as structured 
by the significant relations: “the perceptum has a structure 
of language, as it is dependent on the percipiens that 
inhabits a universe of structuring discourse of its reality and 
perceptions” (Quinet, 2004, p. 38).
Due to the structure of language that determines 
both the subject of perception and the perceived, the 
percipiens is divided and the perceptum is equivocal. 
Thus, the perceived is also structured by the symbolic and 
organized by the signifiers, those that lend themselves 
to the meaning assignment task of naming the data of 
perception. These proposals reinforce the theory that 
reality, far from being an objective datum and taken as 
evidence in accordance with the definitions in the DSM, is 
rather mediated by the symbolic, which means pointing out 
that the organization of the perceptive reality is from the 
order of the signifier:
Dubiety belongs to the signifier [...]. If the signifier 
organizes the perceptum, one cannot think of unity, 
on the contrary, the object can be inserted in several 
meanings. Moreover, what is at stake in the mediation 
between the percipiens and the perceptum is the 
relationship with the Other, which Lacan describes 
in the L-scheme. (Estevão, 2009, p. 148)
The L-scheme represents the alienating relation-
ship, crossed by the imaginary, between the subject and 
the Other and the wall of language. Highlighting three 
signifiers from the Oedipus complex (the mother, the 
child, and the phallus), Lacan constructs an imaginary 
triangle that will be superimposed on the L-scheme, thus 
formalizing the R-scheme and the field of reality. In this 
scheme, “we can seize how the homological imprisonment 
of the meaning of the S subject under the signifier of 
the phallus can resonate in the support of the field of 
reality” (Lacan, 1958/1998, p. 559). From the R-scheme, 
Lacan wonders whether it would be possible to situate 
the geometrical points of this schema in a schema of the 
structure of the subject at the end of the psychotic process, 
thus articulating the I-scheme:
Figure 1. I-Scheme
Source: Lacan (1958/1998, p. 578)
Translation: (directed to us) – transsexual jouissance 
– future of the creature – image of the creature – (loves his 
wife) – creatures of the speech – dropped by the Creator – 
Speech – where what is created is sustained
Taking as reference Schreber and his “elegant 
solution”, the I-scheme is the topology used by Lacan related 
to the constitution of reality in psychosis, represented by 
a double absence in relation to the previously formulated 
scheme: the Name of the Father in the symbolic and the 
phallus in the imaginary. From what is presented in this 
schema, “it is possible to highlight the relationships by 
which the effects of the signifier induction, relapsing in the 
imaginary, determine this disorder of the subject that 
the clinic designates under the features of twilight of the 
world, demanding, to respond to it, new signifier effects” 
(Lacan, 1958/1998, p. 579). For the I-scheme, Lacan 
inscribes the importance of the “function of reality in this 
process, both in its causes and effects” (Lacan, 1958/1998, 
p. 580), synthesizing the subject’s relationship to the Other 
in the psychotic structure and revealing the effect of the 
Name of the Father’s foreclosure.
In this sense, there is nothing in hallucination 
in psychosis that would be out of the symbolic structure 
of language. This statement is illustrated by Lacan with 
analyses of the Schreber case that makes it possible to 
think of psychosis in terms of signifiers:
From this structure, the subject gives the following 
examples [Memoirs..., p. 176]): (1) Nun will ich 
mich... (now I’m going to...); (2) Sie sollen nämlich 
(You must in fact...); (3) Das will ich mir... (In this 
I want), so that we can stick to these, to which he 
has to respond with their significant supplement, 
which does not bring him any doubts, namely: (1) 
surrender to the fact that I am an idiot; (2) regarding 
you being expelled (key word) as a renegade of 
God and wont to a voluptuous debauchery, not 
to mention the rest; (3) to think about it. (Lacan, 
1958/1998, p. 546).
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In this excerpt, Lacan illustrates, from Schreber’s 
memoirs, the phenomena of message and code present in 
psychosis as effect of changes in the significant structuring 
and result of the “predominance of the signifier function 
in these two orders of phenomena” (Lacan, 1958/1998, 
p. 546). The phenomena of code refer to the neological 
phrases in which the “signifier itself is the object of 
communication” (Lacan, 1958/1998, p. 544), which shows 
the radical separation between signifier and signified. 
The message phenomena concerns the moment when 
the phrase is interrupted precisely at the point in which 
the meaning would emerge, revealing a significant chain 
breakage. To the phrases “Now I’m going to...”, “You must 
in fact...”, and “In this I want...”, Schreber responds in 
an attempt to give them meaning: (1) “surrender to the 
fact that I am an idiot”, (2) “be exposed as a renegade of 
God”, (3) “to think about it”. Thus, in the phenomena of 
psychosis, Lacan specifically searches, in the two orders 
of phenomena of code and message, to “represent the 
internal connections of the signifier to the extent that they 
structure the subject” (Lacan, 1958/1998, p. 547) and his 
reality.
Final considerations 
In the classification manuals analyzed in this study, 
psychosis is referred to a conventional descriptive status 
as a strategy of denial from the etiological discussion. By 
favoring what they understand as signs of indisputable 
objec tivity, the DSM is striving to circumvent any 
theoretical reflection (Álvavez, Esteban, & Sauvagnat, 
2004).
The “sense of reality of a real perception, but with 
no external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ” 
(APA, 2004, p. 766) is the definition of hallucination 
created by the DSM as a criterion for classifying a psychotic 
disorder. This definition is more a reissue of a convenient 
description that has been propagated throughout the history 
of psychopathology: hallucination is a perception with no 
object. In our view, another question arises in regards to this 
issue: what is the status of the reality used by the manual in 
defining hallucination as an error of perception? Could this 
not merely be a presumed reality, taken as evidence and, 
mainly, that is imposed as objectively given to the subject?
As the organization of the perceptive reality is 
mediated by the symbolic order and structured by the 
significant ambiguity, we are compelled to ensure that the 
relationship of perception with reality is not as naive or as 
natural as the definition proposed by the DSM.
By formalizing the dependence of the symbolic 
order both in structuring the subject (which is not a 
unifying percipiens) and in the field of perception, Lacan 
innovates this not only by refuting the classical definition 
of hallucination as a perceptum with no object, but also by 
crediting the place of language in this articulation:
The thesis, therefore, is this: the field of perception 
is an ordered field, but ordered according to the 
subject’s relationship with language, and is not 
ordered by the cognitive apparatus or the perceptive 
look. The thesis is radical. It implies that language 
is not an instrument of the subject, but rather an 
operator, in the sense that it produces the subject 
itself. It is also completely new and extreme, because 
Lacan highlights the entire field of perception, and 
not only that of language and speech perception. 
(Soler, 2007, p. 34)
We agree with Soler (2007, p. 35) in emphasizing 
that we cannot forget that the relationship with reality in 
general, specifically perception, is under the incidence of 
the unconscious. This is the Freudian discovery of another 
reality, the psychic reality, which, for Lacan, is not anti-
predicative and does not fall short of language.
Sobre alucinação e realidade: a psicose na CID-10, DSM-IV-TR e DSM-V e  
o contraponto psicanalítico
Resumo: A psicose é um dos poucos termos da psicopatologia clássica e da psicanálise que permanece nos sistemas 
classificatórios atuais, como o DSM (Manual Diagnóstico Estatístico de Transtornos Mentais) e a CID (Classificação Internacional 
de Doenças), o que nos dá condições para investigarmos as diversas maneiras de pensar o sofrimento psíquico. Desse modo, 
analisamos criticamente como o DSM-IV-TR, a sua atual edição (DSM-V) e a CID-10 definem e utilizam o termo “psicose”. A 
apropriação desse conceito ampara-se em definição meramente descritiva como estratégia de recusa ao debate etiológico. A 
alucinação, um dos critérios para a classificação dos “transtornos psicóticos”, é definida partindo-se de realismo ingênuo em que 
a realidade é tomada objetivamente como um dado. Assim, apresentamos o contraponto psicanalítico para essa apropriação: a 
psicanálise aponta para a relevância da estruturação simbólica dos fenômenos perceptivos e para a realidade como construção 
subjetiva.
Palavras-chave: psicanálise, psicose, alucinação, realidade, DSM.
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À propos de l’hallucination et la réalité: la psychose dans la CID-10, DSM-IV-TR et DSM-V et  
la et le contrepoint psychanalytique
Résumé: La psychose est l’un des rares termes de psychopathologie et de la psychanalyse classique qui restent dans les systèmes 
de classification actuels, tels que le DSM (Manuel diagnostique et statistique des troubles mentaux) et la CID (Classification 
internationale des maladies), qui nous donne les conditions pour enquêter sur les différents façons de penser la détresse 
psychologique. Ainsi, nous verrons comment le DSM-IV-TR, son numéro actuel (DSM-V) et la CID-10 définissent et utilisent le 
terme psychose. L’appropriation de ce concept se prend comme une définition purement descriptive de refus de stratégie de 
débat étiologique. L’hallucination, l’un des critères pour la classification des «troubles psychotiques» est définie à partir d’un 
réalisme naïf où la réalité est prise comme une donnée objective. Ainsi, nous présentons le contrepoint psychanalytique de 
cette appropriation: les points psychanalyse à la pertinence de la structuration symbolique des phénomènes de perception et 
la réalité comme une construction subjective.
Mots-clés: psychanalyse, psychose, hallucination, realite, DSM.
Acerca de la alucinación y la realidad: la psicosis en la CID-10, DSM-IV-TR y DSM-V y  
el contrapunto psicoanalítico
Resumen: La psicosis es uno de los pocos términos de la psicopatología clásica y el psicoanálisis que permanecen en los sistemas 
de clasificación actuales, tales como el DSM (Manual Diagnóstico y Estadístico de los Trastornos Mentales) y la CID (Clasificación 
Internacional de Enfermedades), que nos da las condiciones para investigar las distintas formas de pensar sobre la angustia 
psicológica. Por lo tanto, se discute cómo el DSM-IV-TR, su edición actual (DSM-V) y el CID-10 definen y utilizan el término 
psicosis. La apropiación de este concepto mantiene a sí misma como una definición puramente descriptiva de la negativa a la 
estrategia de debate etiológico. La alucinación, uno de los criterios para la clasificación de los “trastornos psicóticos” se define 
empezando con un realismo ingenuo donde la realidad se toma como un hecho objetivamente. Por lo tanto, presentamos 
el contrapunto psicoanalítica a esa apropiación: puntos psicoanálisis a la relevancia de la estructuración simbólica de los 
fenómenos de percepción y la realidad como una construcción subjetiva.
Palabras clave: psicoanálisis, psicosis, alucinación, realidad, DSM.
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